Category: Investing

Betting against gold is the same as betting on governments. He who bets on governments and government money bets against 6,000 years of recorded human history.

~Charles De Gaulle~

There’s a greater than 50 percent probability that the financial system “will come to a grinding halt”.

~ Gregory Peters, head of credit strategy at Morgan Stanley.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601009&sid=ahE9S0dlVt8g&refer=bond

I wonder whether GIC has thought about the full extent of the upcoming financial meltdown. UBS must have approached GIC because no one in the U.S. was prepared to be the single largest shareholder of UBS, which, according to the rumour mill, is technically bankrupt.

Singapore to invest almost US$10b in Swiss bank UBS

Posted: 10 December 2007 1625 hrs

SINGAPORE : The Singapore government’s investment arm announced Monday that it will inject almost US$10 billion into Swiss bank UBS.

The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) said it would inject 11 billion Swiss francs (US$9.74 billion) into UBS, which on Monday announced further writedowns of around US$10 billion (6.8 billion euros) due to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis.

GIC said an undisclosed strategic investor in the Middle East is injecting an additional two billion francs into the bank.

“We made this significant investment in UBS because we have confidence in the long-term growth potential of the bank’s businesses, particularly its global wealth management business,” GIC’s deputy chairman and executive director, Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, told a news conference.

GIC has committed to subscribe to 11 billion Swiss francs worth of mandatory convertible notes that will pay a coupon of nine percent until conversion into ordinary shares about two years after issuance, UBS said.
Depending on the conversion price, Dr Tan said GIC’s total shareholding “could amount to possibly around nine percent of UBS equity”.
GIC currently has less than 1.1 percent of the bank’s equity, he said.
“Nine percent is a large stake. I think we would be the single largest shareholder in UBS,” Dr Tan added.
GIC executives said the move marked a departure for the firm, whose practice has been to take relatively small public equity stakes for portfolio diversification.
“It is a departure from the norm in the sense that it is a larger than usual stake but we made the decision based on our confidence in the long-term prospects of UBS,” said Ng Kok Song, GIC managing director and group chief investment officer.

He and Dr Tan emphasised that GIC does not seek a say in management and said it would be premature to talk of GIC’s obtaining a seat on the UBS board.
“We’ve got no desire to control the business of the bank but as a large investor, as a large long-term investor, we would like to work with the board of the bank, the chairman and the management to create maximum value for all shareholders,” Ng said.

UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank, in October reported its first quarterly loss in five years after its third-quarter results were hit in the financial crisis caused by the ailing US home loans market.
On Monday the bank said in Zurich that it has revised the assumptions and inputs used to value US sub-prime mortgage related positions, resulting in further writedowns of around US$10 billion.

UBS said it expected to post a fourth-quarter loss and may record a net loss for the full year 2007.

“I don’t think that either UBS or any bank can say with absolute certainty that this is the last of the writedowns,” Tan said.
But he added UBS “have taken a very aggressive writedown” and acted before the market develops problems.
“Our intention is to remain a responsible, supportive investor in UBS, hopefully for the long term,” Tan said.

He added that UBS approached GIC about a possible deal, and then “at their own initiative” contacted the other investors whom he declined to identify.
GIC was established in 1981 to manage Singapore’s foreign reserves and now manages “well above” US$100 billion, making it one of the world’s largest fund management companies, its website says.
“The group strives to achieve good long-term returns on assets under our management, to preserve and enhance Singapore’s reserves,” it adds. – AFP/ch

“A gentleman is not to be found in the office before 11 and never stays beyond four.”

– Alfred de Rothschild, quoted in The World’s Banker – The History of the House of Rothschild by Niall Ferguson

“You could be somewhere where the mail was delayed three weeks and do just fine investing.”

– Warren Buffett, quoted on Global-investor.com

Continue reading “Warren Buffett talks to MBA students” →

What happened (and what is still happening) is simply leverage in reverse, or what people used to call a “run on the bank.” But… I think a great more detail would be helpful for you to understand. Please excuse the intricacies: None of this stuff is very easy to understand the first time you think about it. I’ll try to avoid using any jargon…

For nearly 10 years, as interest rates fell from 1995 to 2005, the mortgage and housing business boomed as more and more capital found its way into housing. With lower rates, more people could afford to buy houses. That was good. Unfortunately, it didn’t take long for some people to figure out that with rates so low, they could buy more than one. Or even nine or 10. As more money made its way into housing, prices for real estate went up – 20% a year for several years in some places. The higher prices created more equity… that could then be used as collateral for still more debt. This is what leads to a bubble.

Banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies were happy to fund the madness because they believed new “financial engineering” could take lower-quality home loans (like the kind with zero down payment) and transform these very risky loans, made at the top of the market, into AAA-rated securities. Let me go into some detail about how this worked.

Wall Street’s biggest banks (Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros., Bear Stearns) would buy, say, $500 million worth of low-quality mortgages, underwritten by a mortgage broker, like NovaStar Financial. The individual mortgages – thousands of them at a time – were organized by type and geographic location into a new security, called a residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS). Unlike a regular bond, whose coupon is paid by a single corporation and organized by maturity date, RMBS securities were organized into risk levels, or “tranches.” Thousands of homeowners paid the interest and principal for each tranche. Rating agencies (like Moody’s) and other financial analysts, believed these large bundles of mortgages would be safer to own because the obligation was spread among thousands of separate borrowers and organized into different risk categories that, in theory, would protect the buyers. For example, the broker (like NovaStar) that originated the mortgages would be on the hook for any early defaults, which typically only occurred in fraudulently written mortgages. After that risk padding, the next 3%-5% of the defaults would be taken out of the “equity slice” of the RMBS.

The “equity slice” was the riskiest part of the RMBS. It was typically sold at a wide discount to the total value of the loans in this category, meaning that if defaults were less than expected, the buyer of this part of the package could make a capital gain in addition to a very high yield. Even if defaults were average, the buyer would still earn a nice yield. Hedge funds loved this kind of security because the yield on it would cover the interest on the money the fund would borrow to buy it. Hedge funds could make double-digit capital gains annually, cost-free and risk-free… or so they thought. As long as home prices kept rising and interest rates kept falling, almost every RMBS was safe. Even if a buyer got into trouble, he could still sell his home for more than he paid or find a way to restructure the debt. On the way up, from 1995-2005, there were very few defaults. Everyone made money, which attracted still more money into the market.

After the equity tranche, typically one or two more risk levels offered higher yields at a lower-than-AAA rating. After those few, thin slices, the vast majority of the RMBS – usually 92% of the loan package – would be rated AAA. With an AAA rating, banks, brokerage firms, and insurance companies could own these mortgages – even the exotic mortgages with changing interest rates or no down payments. With the magic of financial engineering and by ordering the perceived risk, financial firms from all over the world could fill their balance sheets with higher-yielding mortgage debt that would pass muster with the regulators charged with making sure they held only the safest assets in reserve.

For a long time, this arrangement worked well for everyone. Wall Street’s banks made a fortune packaging these securities. They even added more layers of packaging – creating CDOs (collateralized debt obligation) and ABSs (asset-backed security) – which are like mutual funds that hold RMBS.

Buyers of these securities did well, too. Hedge funds made what looked like risk-free profits in the equity tranche for years and years.

Insurance companies, banks, and brokers were able to earn higher returns on assets by buying RMBS, CDOs, or ABSs instead of Treasury bonds or AAA-rated corporate debt. And because the collateral was considered AAA, financial institutions of all stripes were able to increase the size of their balance sheets by continuing to borrow against their RMBS inventory. This, in turn, supplied still more money to the mortgage market, which kept the mortgage brokers busy. Remember all the TV ads to refinance your mortgage and the teaser rate loans?

The cycle kept going – more mortgage securities, more leverage, more loans, more housing – until one day the marginal borrower blinked. We’ll never know whom or why… but somewhere out there, the “greater fool” failed to close on that next home or condo. Beginning in about the summer of 2005, the momentum began to slow… and then slowly… imperceptibly… it began to shift.

All the things the cycle had going for it from 1995 to 2005 began to turn the other way. Leverage, in reverse, is devastating.

The first sign of trouble was an unexpectedly high default rate in subprime mortgages. Beginning in early 2007, studies of 20-month-old subprime mortgages showed a default rate greater than 5%, much higher than expected. According to Countrywide Mortgage, the default rates on the riskiest loans made in 2005 and 2006 is expected to grow to as high as 20% – a new all-time record. The big jump in subprime defaults led to the first hedge-fund blowups, such as the May 2007 shutdown of Dillon Reed Capital Management, which lost $150 million in subprime investments in the first quarter of 2007.

Since Dillon Reed Capital, dozens of more funds have blown up as the “equity slice” in mortgage securities collapsed. Remember, these equity tranches were supposed to be the “speed bumps” that protected the rest of the buyers. With the safety net of the equity tranche removed, these huge securities will have to be downgraded by the rating agencies. For example, on July 10, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s downgraded $12 billion of subprime-backed securities. On August 7, the same agencies warned that another $1 billion of “Alt-A” mortgage securities would also likely be downgraded.

Now… these downgrades and hedge-fund liquidations have hugely important consequences. Why? Because as hedge funds have to liquidate, they must sell their RMBSs, CDOs, and ABSs. This pushes prices for these securities down, which results in margin calls on other hedge funds that own the same troubled instruments. That, in turn, pushes them to sell, too.

Very quickly the “liquidity” – the amount of willing buyers for these types of mortgage-backed securities – disappeared. There are literally no bids for much of this paper. That’s why the subprime mortgage brokers – the Novastars and Fremonts – went out of business so quickly. Not only did they take a huge hit paying off the early defaults of their 2005 and 2006 mortgages, but the loans they held on their books were marked down, with no buyers available and their creditors demanded greater margin cover on their lines of credit… poof… The assets they owned were marked down, they couldn’t be readily sold, and they had no access to additional capital.

The failure of the subprime-mortgage structure – which started with higher-than-expected defaults, led to hedge-fund wipeouts and then to mortgage broker bankruptcies – might have been contained to only the subprime segment of the market. That’s why we jumped in during late spring and recommended the higher-quality mortgage firms, such as Thornburg and American Home. We believed that the higher quality of these firms’ underwriting would prevent a similar run on the bank.

But… the risk spread because of the financial engineering.

With Wall Street wrapping together thousands of mortgages from different underwriters, it’s likely that hundreds of financial institutions around the world have traces of bad subprime and Alt-A mortgage debt on their books. Parts of these CDOs were rated AAA. Almost any financial institution could own them – especially hedge funds. Hedge fund investors quickly figured this out – and asked for their money back.

And so, in July, liquidity fears began to creep through the entire mortgage complex. Not because the mortgages themselves were all bad or even because the mortgage securities were all bad – but because all the market players knew a wave of selling, led by hedge funds, was on the way. Nobody wants to be the first buyer when they know thousands of sellers are lined up behind them.

The market “locked up.” Nobody would buy mortgage bonds. And everyone needed to sell. Suddenly even Wall Street’s biggest banks – the very firms that created these mortgage securities – were suffering huge losses, as the bonds kept getting marked down as hedge funds and other leveraged speculators had to sell into a panicked market. In this liquidation, even solid firms, like American Home and Thornburg, were trapped owning new mortgages they couldn’t sell to Wall Street. Meanwhile their banks, worried about the collapsing prices of mortgages, demanded greater collateral.

It’s a classic “run on the bank,” except today the function of the traditional bank has been spread out among several institutions: mortgage brokers, Wall Street security firms, hedge-fund investors, and banks. The real problem is that the long-dated liabilities (a 30-year mortgage) were matched not by reliable depositors, but by fly-by-night hedge funds, which were themselves highly leveraged and subject to redemptions.

That’s why even as the top executives in these firms believed their mortgages were safe and sound, they can’t get the funding they need to hold onto them through the crisis. As Keynes predicted, the lives of every higher-leveraged financial institution is precarious: “The market can be irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”

The hedge funds have no solution. Redemptions will force them to sell. They’ll continue to pressure the market, resulting in huge losses. Hundreds of funds will likely be liquidated.

Wall Street’s investment firms, if they can find additional capital to meet margin calls, might weather the storm… depending on how far it spreads. We saw a move in this direction yesterday when Goldman announced $3 billion in additional funding for its big hedge funds.

For most mortgage brokers, the party is over – goodnight. Something like 90% of them will be out of business by the end of the year.

The only chance they have to survive is very conservative underwriting (which might result in a premium for their mortgage securities) and lots of additional funding. Delta Financial, for example, is renowned for its very conservative underwriting, which requires a substantial (20%) downpayment. The company raised $70 million last week from two investors (one of which is our friend, Mohnish Pabrai) to hang on to its $5.6 billion in on-balance-sheet mortgages. The stock is up 14.5% on the news today. Will it be enough capital? It’s very hard to say. It depends on whether or not the company is able to sell some of its mortgages to raise cash. It depends on whether or not it is downgraded further and the firm receives additional margin calls.

I wouldn’t be surprised to see Thornburg take a similar step – raising funds from existing shareholders. But, for now, Wall Street remains very skeptical the firm will survive. Its shares are down another 46% today.

As analysts, what we got wrong was how far the crisis would spread. We thought by buying the most respected firms with the best underwriting, we could avoid the subprime train wreck. What we didn’t know was how far the subprime sludge had been spread via mortgage securities. The insiders at these firms made the same mistake. They assumed by operating conservatively their businesses would retain a premium price on their mortgage and better access to capital. But in a panic, the baby is often thrown out with the bathwater.

And… we have to consider one more thing. Nobody knows right now how far the crisis will spread. It could certainly get worse. As these mortgage bonds are downgraded, the financial institutions that own them must raise more cash in order to meet liquidity regulations. To hold AAA-rated paper, banks, and other financial institutions need only to maintain $0.56 in capital for each $100 of paper. But as the paper is downgraded, the amount of capital they’re required to hold goes up, exponentially. At a BBB rating, financial institutions must hold $4.80 of capital. At BBB-, they must hold $8 of capital per $100 of asset-backed securities. Thus, as the crisis worsens, the demand for capital from these firms could grow substantially.

We can’t know what will happen. And, as we can’t know, we must stand aside when our trailing stop losses are hit. As I wrote, back in early July, about American Home Mortgage:

Speculation on Wall Street is that “Alt-A” debt will be downgraded next. Most of the loans held by American Home Mortgage are considered “Alt-A” because they have adjustable rates. Even with the high credit scores of the company’s borrowers, if rating agencies downgrade the bonds it holds, the company’s solvency will certainly come into doubt. Whether this happens or not is a moot point for us: Our speculation hasn’t panned out. We should have realized it sooner… but in a few more weeks we might be very glad we got out while we could.

1 Oz. American Eagle Gold Bullion Coin

PRODUCTION DOWN, DEMAND UP.

Every major gold mining country has reported slumping mine production of gold in 2006. As a result of mine strikes, environmental disputes and increasing production costs, global production is continuing to sag and shows no signs of significantly reversing this trend in the near-term. South Africa’s gold-mining output has repeatedly disappointed and this also includes major declines in production in Peru and slumping output in Australia.

“We may see the occasional quarter or monthly production figures that show a spike in production, but the trend is for global production to remain flat to falling in the future,” said research report from Blanchard quoted by Dow Jones in January 2007. “There have been no new world-class discoveries in the last decade, coupled with slashed exploration budgets and industry consolidation.”

1 Oz. Canadian Maple Gold Bullion Coin 99.99% pure

BEATING PLOWSHARES INTO GOLD:
CHINA ENTERS ITS GOLDEN ERA.

Gold ownership for Chinese citizens was legalized in 2004. A system for selling bullion to the largest population in the world is slowly getting off the ground. Once this is established, the effect on gold demand will be staggering. Meanwhile, India, already the world’s largest consumer of gold, is experiencing an 80 percent growth in gold investment following a loosening of trade restrictions.

“Chinese gold consumption is expected to rise 17% this year,” news service Bloomberg quoted China Gold Association chair Cheng Fumin of 2007. “China is the world’s third biggest consumer of the precious metal and is expected to use 350 metric tons this year, up from 300 tons in 2005, owing to an increase in demand for bullion as an investment.”

1 Oz. South African Krugerrand Gold Bullion Coin

CENTRAL BANKS ARE BEGINNING TO DIVERSIFY INTO GOLD.

The effect of central bank policies on the price of gold has always been significant. Today a new era of central bank purchasing is set to begin as the world’s key banks look for diversification of their foreign exchange reserves away from U.S. dollar dominated holdings. The Russian central bank has begun adding gold to reserves, following a commitment to do so in 2006. Other Asian banks are rumored to be planning a similar move. This trend in central bank buying is extremely critical and will have a profound and immediate impact on the gold market in 2007.

“The price of gold will continue to go up and probably very substantially. In the long run, it’s very clear that central banks are basically increasing the supply of money and the supply of gold is obviously very limited.”

— Dr. Marc Faber, January 8th, 2007

NYSE: GOLD

On Terror: “How can we escape from the trap that the terrorists have set us?” he asked. “Only by recognizing that the war on terrorism cannot be won by waging war. We must, of course, protect our security; but we must also correct the grievances on which terrorism feeds…. Crime requires police work, not military action.”

On the Bush Administration: “An open society is a society which allows its members the greatest possible degree of freedom in pursuing their interests compatible with the interests of others,” Soros said. “The Bush administration merely has a narrower definition of self-interest. It does not include the interests of others.”

On the Bush Administration: “The supremacist ideology of the Bush Administration stands in opposition to the principles of an open society, which recognize that people have different views and that nobody is in possession of the ultimate truth. The supremacist ideology postulates that just because we are stronger than others, we know better and have right on our side. The very first sentence of the September 2002 National Security Strategy (the President’s annual laying out to Congress of the country’s security objectives) reads, ‘The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.'”

On Philanthropy: “I’m not doing my philanthropic work, out of any kind of guilt, or any need to create good public relations. I’m doing it because I can afford to do it, and I believe in it.”

On Stock Market Bubbles: “Stock market bubbles don’t grow out of thin air. They have a solid basis in reality, but reality as distorted by a misconception.”